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Abstract
We propose a simple and highly query-efficient black-box ad-
versarial attack named SWITCH, which has a state-of-the-art
performance under `2 and `∞ norms in the score-based set-
ting. In the black box attack setting, designing query-efficient
attacks remains an open problem. The high query efficiency
of the proposed approach stems from the combination of
transfer-based attacks and random-search-based ones. The
surrogate model’s gradient gˆ is exploited for the guidance,
which is then switched if our algorithm detects that it does
not point to the adversarial region by using a query, thereby
keeping the objective loss function of the target model ris-
ing as much as possible. Two switch operations are available,
i.e., SWITCHneg and SWITCHrnd. SWITCHneg takes −gˆ as
the new direction, which is reasonable under an approximate
local linearity assumption. SWITCHrnd computes the gradi-
ent from another model, which is randomly selected from
a large model set, to help bypass the potential obstacle in
optimization. Experimental results show that these strategies
boost the optimization process whereas following the original
surrogate gradients does not work. In SWITCH, no query is
used to estimate the gradient, and all the queries aim to deter-
mine whether to switch directions, resulting in unprecedented
query efficiency. We demonstrate that our approach outper-
forms 10 state-of-the-art attacks on CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100
and TinyImageNet datasets. SWITCH can serve as a strong
baseline for future black-box attacks. The PyTorch source
code is released in https://github.com/machanic/SWITCH.
Introduction
Adversarial attacks are the major security threat to deep neu-
ral networks (DNNs) that add human-imperceptible pertur-
bations to benign images for the misclassification of DNNs.
Adversarial attacks can be divided into two main categories
based on whether the internal information of the target
model is exposed to the attacker, i.e., white-box and black-
box attacks. Black-box attacks are more realistic in real-
world systems because they do not require the parameters
and gradients of the target model. Many methods have been
proposed to craft adversarial examples under the black-box
attack setting. These methods can be divided into transfer-
and query-based attacks.
Transfer-based attacks generate adversarial examples by
attacking a pre-trained surrogate model to fool the target
model (Liu et al. 2017; Papernot, McDaniel, and Good-
fellow 2016; Demontis et al. 2019; Huang et al. 2019).
Transfer-based attacks have practical value because they do
not require querying the target model. However, the attack
success rate is low in the following situations: (1) targeted
attack, and (2) the network structures of the surrogate model
and target model have a large difference. The success rate is
low in these situations because of the incorrect gradient pro-
vided by the surrogate model. This gradient could frequently
point to a non-adversarial region of target model, following
this direction consecutively in the optimization leads to a fail
attack. Hence, it should be considered to switch the gradient
direction when it deviates from the correct direction.
Query-based attacks require an oracle access to the tar-
get model, and we focus on the score-based attack setting
which requires accessing to the loss function value. Some
score-based attacks (Chen et al. 2017; Tu et al. 2019; Ilyas
et al. 2018a; Ilyas, Engstrom, and Madry 2019) estimate an
approximate gradient by querying the target model at multi-
ple points. However, the high query complexity is inevitable
in estimating the approximate gradient with high precision.
To reduce the query complexity, another type of query-based
attacks, i.e., random-search-based attacks (Guo et al. 2019;
Andriushchenko et al. 2020), eliminates the gradient estima-
tion and turns to sampling a random perturbation at each it-
eration, which is either added to or subtracted from the target
image. Then, the modified image is fed to the target model
to compute a loss value. If the loss value peaks a historical
high, the attacker accepts the perturbation; otherwise, it is
rejected. The main issue of this strategy is that the sampled
perturbation does not incorporate the gradient information,
thereby leading to a high rejection rate and inefficient opti-
mization. In addition, nothing is done if the perturbation is
rejected, resulting in many wasted queries. Thus, it is worth
exploring how to incorporate the gradient information to en-
hance the optimization’s efficiency.
In this study, we propose a novel black-box adversarial at-
tack named SWITCH that bridges the gap between transfer-
based attacks and random-search-based ones to improve the
query efficiency. SWITCH incorporates the gradient of a
surrogate model because of its informative guidance. How-
ever, the surrogate gradient is not the same as that of the
target model’s gradient and thus does not always point to
the adversarial region of the target model. To reduce the in-
correct updates, SWITCH makes a temporary image by per-
turbing the target image towards the surrogate gradient. This
temporary image and its label are fed to the target model to
compute a loss value. If the loss is not increased from the last
iteration, SWITCH switches to a new direction. This new
direction is obtained by either taking a negative sign for the
surrogate gradient (SWITCHneg algorithm), or computing a
new gradient of another surrogate model, which is randomly
selected from a large model set (SWITCHrnd algorithm). Fi-
nally, the target image is updated by using the switched gra-
dient. Thus, in each iteration, the algorithm aims to keep
the loss function increasing by switching the gradient. Both
the attack success rate and query efficiency are improved
because the switched direction could avoid following the
wrong direction and consequently bypass the potential ob-
stacle in optimization. Furthermore, SWITCHrnd uses the
random selection in a large model set for computing the new
gradient, which is beneficial for the exploration because it
ensembles the guidances of multiple models to avoid fol-
lowing a potentially inferior model.
We evaluate the proposed method on the CIFAR-10
(Krizhevsky, Hinton et al. 2009), CIFAR-100 (Krizhevsky,
Hinton et al. 2009) and TinyImageNet (Russakovsky et al.
2015) datasets and compare it with 10 state-of-the-art query-
based black-box attacks. The results show that the pro-
posed approach requires the fewest queries to perform a
successful attack, which significantly outperforms other
methods. For example, the proposed approach makes no
more than nine queries in the untargeted attacks under `2
norm constraint, whereas others require hundreds. There-
fore, SWITCH achieves new state-of-the-art performance.
The main contributions of this study are as follows.
(1) We propose a simple and highly query-efficient
black-box attack named SWITCH to bridge the gap be-
tween transfer-based attacks and random-search-based ones
to overcome their shortcomings. The proposed approach
switches the gradient to avoid following the wrong direction
and consequently bypass the potential obstacle in optimiza-
tion, which keeps the loss function increasing as much as
possible.
(2) Despite its simplicity, SWITCH spends extremely
fewer queries than state-of-the-art methods on the CIFAR-
10, CIFAR-100 and TinyImageNet datasets. We consider the
proposed method to be a strong baseline for future attacks.
Background
Black-box attacks. It is unrealistic to obtain internal infor-
mation of target models in many real-world systems, thus
many studies focus on performing attacks in the black-box
setting. Black-box attacks can be divided into transfer- and
query-based attacks. In transfer-based attacks (Liu et al.
2017; Papernot, McDaniel, and Goodfellow 2016; Demontis
et al. 2019; Huang et al. 2019), adversarial examples gener-
ated by attacking a surrogate model might remain adversar-
ial for the target model. Given that targeted attack is difficult
for transfer-based attacks, certain methods use the ensemble
of surrogate models (Liu et al. 2017) or exploit intermediate
feature maps (Inkawhich et al. 2019) to improve the success
rate. However, the attack success rate remains unsatisfactory
and new types of attacks can be detected easily by using
meta-learning-based detector (Ma et al. 2019).
Query-based attacks can be further divided into decision-
and score-based attacks based on the type of information
returned from the target model to the attacker. In decision-
based attacks (Dong et al. 2019; Cheng et al. 2020), the at-
tacker only knows the output label of the target model. In
this study, we focus on the score-based attack, in which the
attacker can obtain the output scores of the target model.
Although the true gradient cannot be directly obtained in
black-box attacks, we can still optimize the adversarial ex-
amples by using the approximate gradients. Early studies
(Chen et al. 2017; Bhagoji et al. 2018) estimate the approxi-
mate gradient by sampling from a noise distribution around
the pixels, which is expensive because each pixel needs two
queries. To reduce the query complexity, methods are im-
proved by incorporating data and time prior information
(Ilyas, Engstrom, and Madry 2019), using meta-learning to
learn a simulator (Ma, Chen, and Yong 2020), searching the
solution among the vertices of the `∞ ball (Moon, An, and
Song 2019), and searching the adversarial perturbation on a
low-dimensional embedding space (Huang and Zhang 2020;
Tu et al. 2019). Different from the methods that estimate gra-
dients, random-search-based attacks (Guo et al. 2019; An-
driushchenko et al. 2020) sample a random perturbation with
the values filled with the maximum allowed perturbation 
or −, which is either added to or subtracted from the target
image. Then, the modified image is fed to the target model
to determine whether to accept the perturbation. This type of
methods significantly reduces the query complexity because
they directly find the solution among the extreme points in
`p ball and do not require the high-cost gradient estimation.
However, the sampled perturbation does not encode the gra-
dient information, resulting in inefficient optimization. In
contrast, the proposed method exploits the gradient of the
surrogate model and then switches the direction when neces-
sary to keep the loss increasing as much as possible, thereby
achieving high attack success rate and query efficiency.
Adversarial Setup. Given the target model f and input-
label pair (x, y), which is correctly classified by f . The ad-
versarial example xadv is produced by xadv = x + δ that
satisfies ||xadv−x||p ≤ , where  is a predefined maximum
allowed distance, and δ is the small perturbation. The goal
is to find xadv that maximizes the attack objective loss func-
tion L(·, ·), which can be the cross-entropy loss or the max-
margin logit loss. The projected gradient descent (PGD) at-
tack (Madry et al. 2018) iteratively updates adversarial ex-
amples as xt+1 =
∏
Bp(x,)(xt + η · g), where
∏
is the pro-
jection operation, Bp(x, ) is the `p ball centered at x with
radius , η is the learning rate, and g is the normalized gra-
dient under `p norm, i.e., g =
∇xtL(f(xt),y)
||∇xtL(f(xt),y)||2 under `2
norm and g = sign(∇xtL(f(xt), y)) under `∞ norm. In this
study, we also follow above steps to update the adversarial
image, except that g is replaced with the surrogate gradient
or the switched one.
Method
The proposed algorithm is shown in Algorithm 1 and Fig. 1.
In each iteration, the algorithm first feeds current image xadv
and its label t to a pre-trained surrogate model m, where
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Figure 1: The first attack iteration of SWITCH under `2 norm constraint (detailed in Algorithm 1), where Llast (initialized as
Llast = L(f(x0), t)) indicates the loss value of the last iteration. In each iteration, the algorithm makes temporary image xtemp
by taking the gradient ascent step with surrogate gradient gˆ. Then, loss value L is computed by feeding xtemp to the target
model. If L < Llast, the algorithm must switch the gradient direction; otherwise, it accepts gˆ. Two switch operation options are
available, namely, SWITCHneg and SWITCHrnd, which either take the reverse direction or compute a new gradient on another
surrogate model. Finally, the adversarial example x1 for the next iteration is produced using the switched direction g.
xadv is initialized as the benign image and updated itera-
tively. To optimize xadv, the attack objective loss, which is
adopted as max-margin logit loss (Carlini and Wagner 2017)
(Eqn. 1), is maximized during attack.
L(yˆ, t) =
{
maxj 6=t yˆj − yˆt, if untargeted attack;
yˆt −maxj 6=t yˆj , if targeted attack; (1)
yˆ is the logits output of the model, t is the target class yadv
in the targeted attack and the true class y in the untargeted
attack, and j indexes the other classes. Then, the gradient
of the surrogate model m’s loss w.r.t. xadv is computed as
gˆ← ∇xadvL(m(xadv), t). Sometimes, directly following gˆ
could not increase the loss because gˆ deviates too much from
the true gradient. SWITCH proposes to query the loss value
to detect such situations and switch to a new direction. We
propose two variants, namely SWITCHneg and SWITCHrnd,
which use different strategies to determine the new direction.
SWITCHneg is motivated by the approximate linearity
assumption of DNNs (Goodfellow, Shlens, and Szegedy
2015). Assuming the target model f is locally linear at the
current point xadv, then the loss value increases along the
−gˆ direction if it decreases along the gˆ direction for any
direction gˆ. Fig. 2 illustrates the case: the loss will decrease
along gˆ direction if gˆ ·∇xadvL(f(xadv), t) < 0. However, the
inner product of −gˆ and ∇xadvL(f(xadv), t) is positive, and
then −gˆ is the rising direction of loss function. Therefore,
SWITCHneg feeds xadv + η · gˆ‖gˆ‖2 1 to f to compute a loss
value L. If L is increased from the last iteration, we accept
gˆ; otherwise, we switch to the negative gradient −gˆ. Once
the final gradient is selected, we update the image xadv and
then project it to `p-ball with a radius of . Finally, we record
1In `∞ norm attack, it should change to xadv + η · sign(gˆ)
gradient of target model 𝛁𝐱𝐚𝐝𝐯𝓛 𝒇 𝐱𝐚𝐝𝐯 , 𝒕
surrogate gradient  𝒈negative direction − 𝒈
𝐱𝐚𝐝𝐯
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Figure 2: Illustration of SWITCHneg, where xadv is the cur-
rent image to be updated. When the target model f is locally
approximately linear, the loss should increase along −gˆ di-
rection if it decreases along gˆ direction.
the loss value Llast of the updated xadv, which is used for
the next iteration to distinguish whether the loss increases or
decreases.
In certain difficult scenarios, the approximate linearity as-
sumption does not necessarily hold even locally. In this sit-
uation, both directions of gˆ and −gˆ cannot increase the loss
value. In practice, when such situation happens, the cur-
rent surrogate model m is less useful, however other models
would help, which leads to SWITCHrnd. A possible expla-
nation is that in some hard cases, consecutively following
the gradient of one surrogate model could make it more and
more useless during the optimization. For example, the sur-
rogate gradient maintains a similar direction, but there seems
to be an obstacle in this direction. However, other directions
could still be useful, so selecting a gradient from another
surrogate model could bypass the obstacle in optimization.
We build a large set of surrogate models for the selection,
because random selection in a large set of surrogate mod-
els is beneficial for the exploration, and the effectiveness
of this strategy is validated in Subspace Attack (Yan, Guo,
Algorithm 1 SWITCH Attack under `2 norm constraint
Input: Input image x, true class label y of x, target class
label yadv, feed-forward function f of the target model, a
surrogate model m, a set of surrogate modelsM, attack
objective loss function L(·, ·) defined in Eqn. 1.
Parameters: image learning rate η, the radius  of `2-norm
ball, switch strategy t ∈ {negative, random}.
Output: xadv that satisfies ‖xadv − x‖2 ≤ .
1: if targeted attack then
2: t← yadv
3: else
4: t← y
5: end if
6: Llast ← L(f(x), t)
7: Initialize the adversarial example xadv ← x
8: while not successful do
9: gˆ← ∇xadvL(m(xadv), t)
10: xtemp ← xadv + η · gˆ‖gˆ‖2 . replacing this line with
xtemp ← xadv + η · sign(gˆ) for `∞ norm attack.
11: L← L(f(xtemp), t)
12: if L ≥ Llast then
13: g← gˆ . accept this gradient directly
14: else
15: if t = negative then . switch gradient
16: g← −gˆ
17: else
18: mrnd ← randomly selected fromM
19: g← ∇xadvL(mrnd(xadv), t)
20: end if
21: end if
22: xadv ←
∏
B2(x,)(xadv+η ·
g
‖g‖2 ) . replacing this line
with xadv ←
∏
B∞(x,)(xadv + η · sign(g)) for `∞ norm
attack, and
∏
Bp(x,) means the `p norm projection.
23: xadv ← Clip(xadv, 0, 1)
24: Llast ← L(f(xadv), t)
25: end while
26: return xadv
and Zhang 2019). After randomly selecting another surro-
gate model mrnd from this set, SWITCHrnd calculates the
gradient ∇xadvL(mrnd(xadv), t) to update the image xadv,
the following steps are the same as SWITCHneg, i.e., image
projection & record Llast. Experimental results in Tab. 2 val-
idate that switching to the gradient of another model when
necessary helps the optimization.
Experiment
Experiment Setting
Datasets and Target Models. Three datasets, namely,
CIFAR-10 (Krizhevsky 2009), CIFAR-100 (Krizhevsky
2009), and TinyImageNet (Russakovsky et al. 2015), are
used for the experiments. We randomly select 1,000 tested
images from their validation sets for evaluation, all of
which are correctly classified by Inception-v3 (Szegedy
et al. 2016). In the CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100 datasets,
we follow Yan et al. (Yan, Guo, and Zhang 2019) to se-
lect the following target models: (1) a 272-layer Pyramid-
Net+Shakedrop model (PyramidNet-272) (Han, Kim, and
Kim 2017; Yamada et al. 2018), which is the state-of-the-art
network on CIFAR-10; (2) a model obtained through a neu-
ral architecture search called GDAS (Dong and Yang 2019);
(3) a wide residual network with 28 layers and 10 times
width expansion (WRN-28) (Zagoruyko and Komodakis
2016); and (4) a wide residual network with 40 layers and
10 times width expansion (WRN-40) (Zagoruyko and Ko-
modakis 2016). In the TinyImageNet dataset, we select
(1) ResNeXt-101 (32x4d) (Xie et al. 2016), (2) ResNeXt-
101 (64x4d) (Xie et al. 2016), and (3) DenseNet-121 with a
growth rate of 32 (Huang et al. 2017) as the target models.
Method Setting. Learning rate η is set to 2.0 for untargeted
and targeted attacks under the `2 norm constraint, except for
the targeted attack of CIFAR-100 dataset, which is set to 0.5.
For the `∞ norm attack, we set η to 0.01. The  is set to 4.6 in
the `2 norm attack and 8/255 in the `∞ norm attack. Surro-
gate model m is selected as ResNet-110 in the CIFAR-10 &
CIFAR-100 datasets and ResNet-101 in the TinyImageNet
dataset. We select 13 models to constitute surrogate model
set M for the CIFAR-10 & CIFAR-100 datasets, and 15
models for the TinyImageNet dataset. The details of model
set M are presented in the appendix, which have different
structures from the tested target models. Note that in the tar-
geted attack, the target class is set to yadv = (y+1) mod C
for all attacks, where yadv is the target class, y is the true
class, and C is the class number.
Compared Methods. The compared query-based black-box
attacks are listed in Tab. 1. It includes Bandits attack (Ilyas,
Engstrom, and Madry 2019), the nature evolution strategy
(NES) (Ilyas et al. 2018b), Meta Attack (Du et al. 2020),
RGF method (Nesterov 2017), P-RGF method (Cheng et al.
2019), Projection & Probability-driven Black-box Attack
(PPBA) (Li et al. 2020), Parsimonious (Moon, An, and
Song 2019), Simple Black-box Attacks (SimBA) (Guo et al.
2019), SignHunter (Al-Dujaili and O’Reilly 2019), and
Square Attack (Andriushchenko et al. 2020). These meth-
ods consist of different strategies. Bandits, NES, RGF, and
P-RGF estimate the approximate gradient to optimize the
adversarial example; SimBA, PPBA, and Square Attack rely
on random search optimization; Parsimonious optimizes a
discrete surrogate problem by finding the solution among
the vertices of the `∞ ball; PPBA utilizes a low-frequency
constrained sensing matrix; P-RGF and Meta Attack require
Method Surrogate Model(s) Gradient Estimation Based on Random Search
Bandits × X ×
NES × X ×
RGF × X ×
P-RGF X X ×
Meta Attack X X ×
PPBA × × X
Parsimonious × × ×
SimBA × × X
SignHunter × × ×
Square Attack × × X
SWITCH X × ×
Table 1: Different attack methods adopt different strategies.
Attack switch ratio Lswitched > Llast ratio Lswitched > Lxtemp ratio
D121 R32 R64 D121 R32 R64 D121 R32 R64
SWITCHneg 43.9% 43.9% 46.1% 45% 48.6% 44.3% 70% 73.1% 69.5%
SWITCHrnd 36.8% 36.6% 45.1% 74.5% 86.5% 67.6% 90.1% 94.5% 86.3%
SWITCHneg 41.4% 40.8% 40.4% 50.3% 52.5% 53.3% 72.3% 74.1% 74.1%
SWITCHrnd 44.6% 42.9% 44.9% 76.3% 78.9% 77.9% 90% 92% 91.2%
Table 2: The ratio of performing switch operation and the
corresponding increased loss in all iterations of attacking
1,000 TinyImageNet tested images. The first row block
shows `2 norm untargeted attack, and the second row block
shows `∞ norm untargeted attack. D121: DenseNet-121,
R32: ResNeXt-101 (32×4d), R64: ResNeXt-101 (64×4d).
surrogate models. Tab. 1 summarizes the strategies of these
methods. We use the PyTorch (Paszke et al. 2019) frame-
work for all experiments, and the official PyTorch imple-
mentations of Meta Attack, PPBA, Bandits, SimBA, Sign-
Hunter, and Square Attack are used in the experiments. For
experimental consistency, we translate the code of NES,
Parsimonious, RGF, and P-RGF from the official Tensor-
Flow (Abadi et al. 2016) implementation into the PyTorch
version. The official implementations of RGF and P-RGF
only support untargeted attack, so they are excluded from
the targeted attack experiments. Parsimonious only supports
`∞ norm attack. P-RGF improves query efficiency of RGF
by utilizing surrogate models, and uses the same surrogate
model m as our method does. All methods are limited to a
maximum of 10,000 queries in all experiments. The same
 value is set for all attacks, that is, 4.6 in the `2 norm at-
tack and 8/255 in the `∞ norm attack. The configurations of
these methods are provided in the appendix.
Evaluation Metric. According to previous studies (Ilyas
et al. 2018a; Yan, Guo, and Zhang 2019), we use the attack
success rate, the average and the median of queries as the
evaluation metric. All attacks are performed on the correctly
classified benign images, so the attack success rate is calcu-
lated based on them. The average and median of queries are
counted on the successful attacked images.
Ablation Study
The Ratio of Increased Loss with SWITCH. To inspect
the effectiveness of SWITCH, we conduct one-step empir-
ical analysis on TinyImageNet with untargeted attack, i.e.,
we check whether the loss could be increased or decreased
by following the switched gradients. Specifically, we first
count the proportion of switch operations performed in all
attack iterations. Then, only the samples that are updated
by using the switched gradient are selected and then sent
to the target model to record a loss Lswitched. The ratio of
samples with Lswitched larger than the loss of previous itera-
tion (Llast) is counted (Lswitched > Llast ratio). The ratio of
Lswitched > Lxtemp is counted to check whether the switched
gradient is better than the gradient before switching, where
xtemp is the image updated by using the surrogate gradient
before switching. Results of Tab. 2 show that (1) switching
is better than not switching (see Lswitched > Lxtemp ratio);
(2) switching gradients are rather effective in optimization,
since the losses of a large fraction of samples are increased
Attack Attack Success Rate Avg. Query Median Query
D121 R32 R64 D121 R32 R64 D121 R32 R64
NO SWITCH 96.9% 96.5% 94.5% 119 110 183 4 5 5
SWITCHneg 99.6% 99.6% 98.8% 30 19 24 3 4 4
SWITCHrnd 100% 99.9% 99.9% 5 6 21 3 4 3
NO SWITCH 50.1% 35% 33.9% 685 866 878 31 40 44
SWITCHneg 86.8% 75.5% 73% 322 611 503 20 37 37
SWITCHrnd 94.4% 87.7% 88.1% 167 265 269 11 17 17
Table 3: NO SWITCH vs. SWITCHneg vs. SWITCHrnd
of untargeted attack experiments on TinyImageNet dataset.
The first row block shows `2 norm attack, and the second
row block shows `∞ norm attack. D121: DenseNet-121, R32:
ResNeXt-101 (32×4d), R64: ResNeXt-101 (64×4d).
from the last iteration after following the switched gradient
(Lswitched > Llast) even though they have Lxtemp < Llast.
NO SWITCH versus SWITCH. To validate the effective-
ness of the gradient switch operation in terms of attack
success rate and query efficiency, we compare SWITCHrnd
and SWITCHneg with NO SWITCH, i.e., the algorithm
without switching the surrogate gradient. In other words,
NO SWITCH directly uses the gradient gˆ of the surrogate
model m, which is not changed during the attack. The ex-
perimental results on TinyImageNet are listed in Tab. 3. We
can draw the following conclusions based on Tab. 3:
(1) NO SWITCH performs the worst among all variants.
Thus, the switching of the gradient direction is crucial for
achieving high attack success rate and query efficiency.
(2) SWITCHrnd outperforms SWITCHneg with fewer queries
and higher attack success rate. This result is consistent with
Tab. 2 which shows that SWITCHrnd can increase the loss
Lswitched more than SWITCHneg.
Comparisons with State-of-the-Art Methods
Untargeted and Targeted Attack Results. We compare
the proposed approach with state-of-the-art methods by at-
tacking PyramidNet-272, GDAS, WRN-28, and WRN-40 in
CIFAR-10 & CIFAR-100 datasets. Tab. 4 and Tab. 5 show
the experimental results of the untargeted and targeted attack
on CIFAR-10 & CIFAR-100 datasets. In TinyImageNet, we
conduct experiments by attacking DenseNet-121, ResNeXt-
101 (32×4d), and ResNeXt-101 (64×4d), whose results
are shown in Tab. 6, Tab. 7 and Tab. 8. RGF and P-RGF
are excluded from the targeted attack experiments because
their official implementations only support the untargeted at-
tack. These results demonstrate that (1) the performance of
SWITCHneg is already satisfactory for untargeted attack in
CIFAR-10 & CIFAR-100. Tab. 4 shows that SWITCHneg re-
quires only a few queries (≤ 3) to achieve 100% success rate
in `2 norm attack; (2) SWITCHrnd performs the best among
all attack methods. To inspect the performance of attacking
defensive models, we conduct the experiments of attacking
two defensive models, i.e., ComDefend (Jia et al. 2019) and
Feature Distillation (Liu et al. 2019), and the results are pre-
sented in the appendix due to space limitation.
Detailed Experimental Figures. To present the results
more comprehensively, we investigate the attack success
Dataset Norm Attack Attack Success Rate Avg. Query Median Query
PyramidNet-272 GDAS WRN-28 WRN-40 PyramidNet-272 GDAS WRN-28 WRN-40 PyramidNet-272 GDAS WRN-28 WRN-40
CIFAR-10
`2
NES 99.3% 74.8% 99.9% 99.5% 202 123 159 154 200 100 100 100
RGF 100% 100% 100% 100% 216 168 153 150 204 152 102 152
P-RGF 100% 100% 100% 100% 64 40 76 73 62 20 64 64
Meta Attack 84.2% 92.9% 92.4% 95.1% 3410 2097 2202 1996 2862 1561 1562 1433
Bandits 100% 100% 100% 100% 151 66 107 98 110 54 80 78
PPBA 99% 100% 100% 99.9% 181 130 146 127 110 63 86 83
SimBA 99.9% 96.4% 99.7% 99.8% 331 357 292 261 243 142 187 192
SignHunter 100% 99% 100% 100% 103 91 93 74 54 28 40 36
Square Attack 100% 100% 100% 100% 46 16 24 24 26 4 7 7
SWITCHneg 100% 100% 100% 100% 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
SWITCHrnd 100% 100% 100% 100% 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
`∞
NES 86.8% 71.4% 74.2% 77.6% 1559 628 1235 1209 600 300 400 400
RGF 99% 93.8% 98.6% 98.8% 955 646 1178 928 668 460 663 612
P-RGF 97.3% 97.9% 97.7% 98% 742 337 703 564 408 128 236 217
Meta Attack 33.8% 61.7% 64% 71.7% 3668 3055 2658 2566 2864 2344 1950 1823
Bandits 99.6% 100% 99.4% 99.9% 1015 391 611 542 560 166 224 228
PPBA 96.6% 99.4% 96.8% 97.4% 860 327 714 533 322 120 196 179
Parsimonious 100% 100% 100% 100% 701 345 891 738 523 230 424 375
SimBA 93.9% 94.9% 93.8% 96.1% 743 504 715 677 387 205 316 331
SignHunter 99.4% 91.8% 100% 100% 379 253 506 415 189 106 205 188
Square Attack 100% 100% 99.9% 100% 332 126 403 342 182 54 144 139
SWITCHneg 78.7% 96.8% 97.1% 97.6% 441 111 85 89 23 4 3 3
SWITCHrnd 87.9% 98.3% 98.5% 98.7% 203 45 36 40 9 4 3 3
CIFAR-100
`2
NES 92.5% 90.1% 98.3% 99.7% 118 83 103 106 100 50 100 100
RGF 100% 100% 100% 100% 114 110 106 106 102 101 102 102
P-RGF 100% 100% 100% 100% 54 46 54 73 62 62 62 62
Meta Attack 99.1% 99.7% 99.7% 98.3% 850 798 1098 1163 651 524 781 782
Bandits 100% 100% 100% 100% 58 54 64 65 42 42 52 52
PPBA 99.6% 99.9% 99.6% 99.9% 74 67 94 100 39 35 46 48
SimBA 100% 98.1% 99.8% 99.6% 172 157 176 202 96 56 104 108
SignHunter 100% 99.9% 100% 100% 32 26 38 44 16 10 16 14
Square Attack 100% 100% 100% 100% 8 5 10 9 1 1 1 1
SWITCHneg 100% 100% 100% 100% 2 1 2 2 1 1 1 1
SWITCHrnd 100% 100% 100% 100% 2 1 2 2 1 1 1 1
`∞
NES 91.3% 89.7% 92.5% 89.5% 430 266 660 606 200 150 250 250
RGF 99.7% 98.8% 98.9% 99% 385 420 544 628 256 255 357 357
P-RGF 99.3% 98.3% 98% 97.8% 308 220 371 480 147 116 136 181
Meta Attack 99.7% 99.5% 98.3% 97.1% 932 922 1142 1226 653 652 782 782
Bandits 100% 100% 99.8% 99.8% 266 209 262 260 68 56 106 92
PPBA 99.3% 99.8% 98.8% 98.6% 164 157 275 279 63 49 82 77
Parsimonious 100% 100% 100% 99.9% 287 185 383 422 204 103 215 213
SimBA 99.9% 97.8% 98.2% 97% 322 190 386 431 127 67 150 152
SignHunter 99% 97.3% 99.8% 100% 125 119 211 255 52 37 59 60
Square Attack 100% 100% 100% 99.8% 76 57 150 162 17 19 46 36
SWITCHneg 92.9% 96.8% 94.1% 94.6% 108 41 120 90 4 3 3 3
SWITCHrnd 96.9% 97.1% 95.3% 96.6% 69 50 77 57 4 3 3 3
Table 4: Experimental results of untargeted attack in CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100 datasets.
Dataset Attack Attack Success Rate Avg. Query Median Query
PyramidNet-272 GDAS WRN-28 WRN-40 PyramidNet-272 GDAS WRN-28 WRN-40 PyramidNet-272 GDAS WRN-28 WRN-40
CIFAR-10
NES 93.7% 95.3% 98.5% 97.7% 1474 1515 1043 1088 1251 999 881 882
Meta Attack 35.2% 70.9% 55.1% 56.4% 4584 3809 4131 4097 4352 3328 3586 3714
Bandits 99.7% 100% 97.3% 98.4% 852 718 1082 997 458 538 338 398
PPBA 98.8% 99.8% 97.1% 99.4% 696 444 740 612 307 220 284 269
SimBA 99.2% 99.7% 98.5% 99.2% 588 358 537 418 455 274 394 359
SignHunter 100% 100% 100% 100% 336 131 247 177 200 78 126 102
Square Attack 100% 100% 100% 100% 142 94 124 96 89 62 61 56
SWITCHneg 99.3% 93.2% 99.8% 100% 171 395 120 27 9 11 5 5
SWITCHrnd 100% 100% 100% 100% 6 7 4 4 5 5 4 4
CIFAR-100
NES 87.6% 77% 89.3% 87.5% 1300 1405 1383 1424 1102 1172 1061 1049
Meta Attack 85% 89.1% 63.2% 42.3% 3833 3521 4713 4861 3457 2946 4481 4610
Bandits 99.6% 100% 98.9% 91.5% 1442 847 1645 2436 1056 678 1150 1578
PPBA 98.8% 99.8% 98.3% 92.9% 803 476 907 1546 434 306 469 742
SimBA 99.2% 99.7% 97.8% 94.7% 522 358 590 658 403 289 446 539
SignHunter 100% 100% 100% 100% 371 269 385 441 267 149 226 260
Square Attack 100% 100% 100% 99.8% 250 175 262 384 151 121 163 178
SWITCHneg 86.8% 86.4% 86.4% 78.8% 801 723 985 1089 145 86 159 202
SWITCHrnd 100% 100% 100% 100% 26 31 26 27 16 16 15 16
Table 5: Experimental results of targeted attack under `2 norm constraint in CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100 datasets.
Attack Attack Success Rate Avg. Query Median Query
D121 R32 R64 D121 R32 R64 D121 R32 R64
NES 85.4% 68.5% 68.2% 334 507 545 250 350 350
RGF 99.4% 98.7% 98.9% 364 741 679 255 410 410
P-RGF 99.8% 99.3% 99.1% 217 270 285 84 86 85
Meta Attack 91.1% 85.3% 86.4% 3596 4053 4105 3074 3585 3712
Bandits 100% 99.5% 99.7% 421 823 774 256 456 458
PPBA 99.8% 99.8% 99.6% 231 481 412 146 251 243
SimBA 98% 92.9% 93.7% 278 489 482 186 341 333
SignHunter 99.6% 99.5% 99.9% 119 334 322 37 61 75
Square Attack 100% 99.5% 99.9% 85 224 230 28 58 53
SWITCHneg 99.6% 99.6% 98.8% 30 19 24 3 4 4
SWITCHrnd 100% 99.9% 99.9% 5 6 21 3 4 3
Table 6: Experimental results of untargeted attack under `2
norm in TinyImageNet dataset. D121: DenseNet-121, R32:
ResNeXt-101 (32×4d), R64: ResNeXt-101 (64×4d).
Attack Attack Success Rate Avg. Query Median Query
D121 R32 R64 D121 R32 R64 D121 R32 R64
NES 74.6% 45.4% 45.4% 1358 2038 2038 500 800 800
RGF 96.4% 85.3% 87.5% 1146 2088 2097 667 1280 1326
P-RGF 94.5% 83.9% 85.9% 883 1583 1581 448 657 690
Meta Attack 71.6% 36% 37.4% 3973 3979 4109 3329 3585 3457
Bandits 99.2% 94.1% 95.3% 964 1737 1662 520 954 1014
PPBA 99.6% 97.9% 98.2% 403 926 814 191 404 389
Parsimonious 100% 99.3% 99.3% 273 643 579 190 300 284
SimBA 98.1% 93.8% 94.6% 381 861 855 197 410 391
SignHunter 99.5% 98.6% 99% 201 581 527 59 122 152
Square Attack 100% 99.4% 99.6% 160 396 379 74 158 142
SWITCHneg 86.8% 75.5% 73% 322 611 503 20 37 37
SWITCHrnd 94.4% 87.7% 88.1% 167 265 269 11 17 17
Table 7: Experimental results of untargeted attack under `∞
norm in TinyImageNet dataset. D121: DenseNet-121, R32:
ResNeXt-101 (32×4d), R64: ResNeXt-101 (64×4d).
Attack Attack Success Rate Avg. Query Median Query
D121 R32 R64 D121 R32 R64 D121 R32 R64
NES 88.5% 88% 88.2% 4625 4959 4758 4337 4702 4440
Meta Attack 23.7% 20.7% 17.9% 5351 5537 5601 5250 5249 5248
Bandits 85.1% 72.2% 72.4% 2724 3550 3542 1860 2698 2852
PPBA 89.3% 85.4% 83.7% 1593 2321 2153 901 1388 1383
SimBA 85.6% 59.8% 66.8% 933 901 946 740 809 865
SignHunter 97.9% 96.9% 98% 1127 1624 1597 649 995 992
Square Attack 96.6% 94% 94.7% 1014 1649 1628 455 836 759
SWITCHneg 59.1% 56.2% 51.7% 1302 1312 1310 321 275 294
SWITCHrnd 94.7% 93.9% 94% 179 186 286 28 29 30
Table 8: Experimental results of targeted attack under `2
norm in TinyImageNet dataset. D121: DenseNet-121, R32:
ResNeXt-101 (32×4d), R64: ResNeXt-101 (64×4d).
rates by limiting different maximum numbers of queries
in targeted attacks under `2 norm constraint. Fig. 3 shows
the superior success rate of the proposed approach. Fig. 4
demonstrates the relation between the query number and the
attack success rate from a different angle. Fig. 4 shows the
average query number that reaches different desired success
rates. Specifically, given a desired success rate a and the
query list Q of all samples, the average query (Avg. Qa)
is defined as follows:
Avg. Qa =
∑N
i=1 Qˆi
N
, where Qˆ = Q[Q ≤ Pa], (2)
where Pa is the ath percentile value ofQ andN is the length
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(c) DN-121 in TinyImageNet
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(d) WRN-28 in CIFAR-100
Figure 3: Comparison of attack success rate at different lim-
ited maximum queries in targeted attack under `2 norm,
where PN-272: PyramidNet-272, DN-121: DenseNet-121.
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Figure 4: Comparison of the average query per successful
image at different desired success rates in the targeted attack
under `2 norm, where DN-121 is DenseNet-121.
of Qˆ. Fig. 4 shows that SWITCHrnd produces the lowest
curve and is significantly more query-efficient than others.
More figures are presented in the appendix.
Conclusion
In this study, we propose a simple and highly efficient black-
box attack named SWITCH. SWITCH exploits the gradi-
ent of a surrogate model and then switches the gradient if it
points to the non-adversarial region of target model, which
keeps the loss function increasing as much as possible.
Two switch operations are introduced, i.e., SWITCHneg and
SWITCHrnd, which adopt different strategies to determine
a new direction. These strategies significantly boost the op-
timization process. Extensive experiments demonstrate that
the proposed method achieves state-of-the-art performance.
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Appendix: Experiment Settings
Settings of Compared Methods
RGF and P-RGF attack. Hyperparameters of RGF (Nes-
terov 2017) and P-RGF (Cheng et al. 2019) attacks are listed
in Tab. 10. The experiments of RGF and P-RGF are con-
ducted by using the PyTorch version translated from the offi-
cial TensorFlow implementation located in P-RGF’s Github
repository.
Norm Hyperparameter Value
`2
h, image learning rate 2.0
σ, sampling variance 1e-4
, maximum radius of `2 norm ball 4.6
`∞
h, image learning rate 0.005
σ, sampling variance 1e-4
, maximum radius of `∞ norm ball 8/255
`2, `∞ surrogate model used in CIFAR-10/100 ResNet-110
`2, `∞ surrogate model used in TinyImageNet ResNet-101
Table 9: The hyperparameters of RGF and P-RGF attacks.
Bandits. Hyperparameters of Bandits (Ilyas, Engstrom, and
Madry 2019) are listed in Tab. 10. The OCO learning rate
is used to update the prior, where the prior is an alias of
gradient g for updating the input image.
Parsimonious. Hyperparameters of Parsimonious (Moon,
An, and Song 2019) are listed in Tab. 11. Parsimonious only
supports `∞ norm attack. We follow the official implemen-
tation to set the initial block size to 4 in all experiments.
SignHunter. Hyperparameters of SignHunter (Al-Dujaili
and O’Reilly 2019) are listed in Tab. 12.
Square Attack. Hyperparameters of Square Attack (An-
driushchenko et al. 2020) are shown in Tab. 13. Square At-
tack randomly samples a square window filled with pertur-
bations in each iteration. The area of this square window in
the first iteration is initialized as H ×W × p, which is then
reduced in subsequent iterations.
PPBA. Hyperparameters of Projection & Probability-driven
Black-box Attack (PPBA) (Li et al. 2020) are shown in
Norm Hyperparameter Value
`2
δ, finite difference probe 0.01
η, image learning rate 0.1
ηg , OCO learning rate 0.1
τ , Bandits exploration 0.3
, maximum radius of `2 norm ball 4.6
maximum query times 10,000
`∞
δ, finite difference probe 0.1
η, image learning rate 1/255
ηg , OCO learning rate 1.0
τ , Bandits exploration 0.3
, maximum radius of `∞ norm ball 8/255
maximum query times 10,000
Table 10: The hyperparameters of Bandits.
Hyperparameter Value
the number of iterations in local search 1
k, initial block size 4
batch size 64
no hierarchical evaluation False
, maximum radius `∞ norm ball 8/255
Table 11: The hyperparameters of Parsimonious.
Hyperparameter Value
, maximum radius of `2 norm ball 4.6
, maximum radius of `∞ norm ball 8/255
Table 12: The hyperparameters of SignHunter.
Hyperparameter Value
p, initial probability of changing a coordinate 0.05
, maximum radius of `2 norm ball 4.6
, maximum radius of `∞ norm ball 8/255
Table 13: The hyperparameters of Square Attack.
Dataset Hyperparameter Value
CIFAR-10/100
order strided
ρ, the change of measurement vector z 0.01
µ, the momentum of calculating effec-
tive probability
1
frequency dim, used in initialize blocks 11
low-frequency dimension 1,500
stride, used in initialize blocks 7
number of samples per iteration 1
, maximum radius `2 norm ball 4.6
, maximum radius `∞ norm ball 8/255
TinyImageNet
order strided
ρ, the change of measurement vector z 0.01
µ, the momentum of calculating effec-
tive probability
1
frequency dim, used in initialize block 15
low-frequency dimension 1,500
stride, used in initialize block 7
number of samples per iteration 1
, maximum radius of `2 norm ball 4.6
, maximum radius of `∞ norm ball 8/255
Table 14: The hyperparameters of PPBA.
Dataset Hyperparameter Value
CIFAR-10/100
order strided
frequency dim, used in initialize blocks 11
stride, used in initialize blocks 7
, maximum radius of `2 norm ball 4.6
, maximum radius of `∞ norm ball 8/255
pixel , step size per pixel 0.2
DCT mode True
TinyImageNet
order strided
frequency dim, used in initialize blocks 15
stride, used in initialize blocks 7
, maximum radius of `2 norm ball 4.6
, maximum radius of `∞ norm ball 8/255
pixel , step size per pixel 0.2
DCT mode True
Table 15: The hyperparameters of SimBA.
Tab. 14. We follow the official implementation to initialize
the random matrix (strided) with the dimension of 1,500.
SimBA. Hyperparameters of Simple Black-box Attacks
(SimBA) (Guo et al. 2019) are shown in Tab. 15. SimBA
uses “strided mode” to construct perturbations during attack.
NES. Hyperparameters for NES attack (Ilyas et al. 2018b)
are listed in Tab. 17. In the targeted attack setting, NES uses
a randomly selected image of the target class as the initial
image to optimize. Then, NES reduces its distance to the be-
nign input image iteratively. Finally, the `p distance between
the adversarial image and the benign image is within a preset
. So, its hyperparameters are carefully tuned in untargeted
and targeted attack separately, so as to achieve the highest
attack success rate. The experiments of NES are conducted
by using the PyTorch implementation.
Meta Attack. Hyperparameters of Meta Attack (Du et al.
2020) are listed in Tab. 18. the meta interval m is set to 3 in
two cases, namely, the targeted attack and the experiments of
TinyImageNet dataset. In other cases, the meta interval m is
set to 5. The gradients of training data that are generated by
using the pre-trained models listed in Tab. 19.
SWITCH. Hyperparameters of the proposed SWITCH are
listed in Tab. 16. The configurations of the surrogate model
Norm Hyperparameter Value
`2
η, image learning rate except the `2
norm targeted attack on CIFAR-100
2.0
η, image learning rate for the targeted
attack under `2 norm on CIFAR-100
0.5
, maximum radius of `2 norm ball 4.6
`∞
η, image learning rate 0.01
, maximum radius of `2 norm ball 8/255
`2, `∞
m, surrogate model used in CIFAR-10
& CIFAR-100 dataset
ResNet-110
`2, `∞
m, surrogate model used in TinyIma-
geNet dataset
ResNet-101
Table 16: The hyperparameters of SWITCH attack.
Dataset Attack Norm Hyperparameter Value
CIFAR-10
Untargeted
`2
, radius of `2 norm ball 4.6
h, learning rate 2.0
`∞
, radius of `∞ norm ball 8/255
h, learning rate 1e-2
Targeted
`2
0, initial distance from the source
image
20.0
, final radius of `2 norm ball 4.6
δ0 , initial rate of decaying  1.0
δmin , the minimum rate of decaying

0.1
hmax, the maximum learning rate 2.0
hmin, the minimum learning rate 5e-5
`∞
0, initial distance from the source
image
1.0
, final radius of `∞ norm ball 8/255
δ0 , initial rate of decaying  0.1
δmin , the minimum rate of decaying

0.01
hmax, the maximum learning rate 0.1
hmin, the minimum learning rate 0.01
CIFAR-100
Untargeted
`2
, radius of `2 norm ball 4.6
h, learning rate 2.0
`∞
, radius of `∞ norm ball 8/255
h, learning rate 1e-2
Targeted
`2
0, initial distance from the source
image
20.0
, final radius of `2 norm ball 4.6
δ0 , initial rate of decaying  1.0
δmin , the minimum rate of decaying

0.3
hmax, the maximum learning rate 1.0
hmin, the minimum learning rate 5e-5
`∞
0, initial distance from the source
image
1.0
, final radius of `∞ norm ball 8/255
δ0 , initial rate of decaying  0.1
δmin , the minimum rate of decaying

0.01
hmax, the maximum learning rate 0.1
hmin, the minimum learning rate 0.01
TinyImageNet
Untargeted
`2
, radius of `2 norm ball 4.6
h, learning rate 2.0
`∞
, radius of `∞ norm ball 8/255
h, learning rate 1e-2
Targeted
`2
0, initial distance from the source
image
40.0
, final radius of `2 norm ball 4.6
δ0 , initial rate of decaying  1.0
δmin , the minimum rate of decaying

0.1
hmax, the maximum learning rate 2.0
hmin, the minimum learning rate 0.5
`∞
0, initial distance from the source
image
1.0
, final radius of `∞ norm ball 8/255
δ0 , initial rate of decaying  0.1
δmin , the minimum rate of decaying

1e-3
hmax, the maximum learning rate 0.1
hmin, the minimum learning rate 0.01
Table 17: The hyperparameters of NES attack, where the
sampling variance σ for gradient estimation is set to 1e-3,
the number of samples per draw is set to 50, and the max-
imum queries is set to 10,000 for all types of attacks in all
datasets.
setM used in SWITCHrnd are listed in Tab. 19.
Pre-trained Networks and Target Models
Surrogate Model Set M. In our experiments, 14 types of
networks and 15 types of networks are selected as the sur-
rogate model setM in CIFAR-10/CIFAR-100 and TinyIm-
ageNet datasets, respectively. The names of these networks
and their training configurations are shown in Tab. 19.
Additional Experiment Results
Results of Attacks on Defensive Models. Tab. 20 shows the
experimental results of attacking defensive models. ComDe-
fend (Jia et al. 2019) is a defensive model that consists of a
compression convolutional neural network (ComCNN) and
a reconstruction convolutional neural network (RecCNN) to
transform the adversarial image into its clean version to de-
fend against attacks. Feature Distillation (Liu et al. 2019) is a
JPEG-based compression defensive framework. Both defen-
sive models adopt the backbone as the ResNet-50 network.
The results of Tab. 20 conclude that (1) SWITCHrnd spends
the fewest queries in breaking ComDefend and Feature Dis-
tillation on TinyImageNet dataset. (2) Parsimonious per-
forms the best in breaking Feature Distillation on CIFAR-10
and CIFAR-100 datasets.
Detailed Experimental Figures. Fig. 5, Fig. 6, Fig. 7,
Fig. 8, and Fig. 9 show the attack success rates by limit-
ing different maximum queries. Fig. 10, Fig. 11, and Fig. 12
measure the average number of queries over successful im-
ages that reaches different desired success rates. These fig-
ures demonstrate the relation between the query number and
the attack success rate from the different angle. Fig. 13, Fig.
14, Fig. 15 show the query number’s histogram of attacks
on CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100, TinyImageNet. The results show
that the highest red bars (SWITCHrnd) are always located in
the low query number’s area, thereby confirming that most
adversarial examples of SWITCHrnd have the fewest queries.
Dataset Attack Norm Hyperparameter Value
CIFAR-10/100
Untargeted
`2
h, learning rate 1e-2
top-q coordinates for estimat-
ing gradient
125
m, meta interval 5
use tanh, the change-of-
variables method
true
, radius of `2 norm ball 4.6
`∞
h, learning rate 1e-2
top-q coordinates for estimat-
ing gradient
125
m, meta interval 5
use tanh, the change-of-
variables method
false
, radius of `∞ norm ball 8/255
Targeted
`2
h, learning rate 1e-2
top-q coordinates for estimat-
ing gradient
125
m, meta interval 3
use tanh, the change-of-
variables method
true
, radius of `2 norm ball 4.6
`∞
h, learning rate 1e-2
top-q coordinates for estimat-
ing gradient
125
m, meta interval 3
use tanh, the change-of-
variables method
false
, radius of `∞ norm ball 8/255
TinyImageNet
Untargeted
`2
h, learning rate 1e-2
top-q coordinates for estimat-
ing gradient
125
m, meta interval 3
use tanh, the change-of-
variables method
true
, radius of `2 norm ball 4.6
`∞
h, learning rate 1e-2
top-q coordinates for estimat-
ing gradient
125
m, meta interval 3
use tanh, the change-of-
variables method
false
, radius of `∞ norm ball 8/255
Targeted
`2
h, learning rate 1e-2
top-q coordinates for estimat-
ing gradient
125
m, meta interval 3
use tanh, the change-of-
variables method
true
, radius of `2 norm ball 4.6
`∞
h, learning rate 1e-2
top-q coordinates for estimat-
ing gradient
125
m, meta interval 3
use tanh, the change-of-
variables method
false
, radius of `∞ norm ball 8/255
Table 18: The hyperparameters of Meta Attack, where the
binary steps is set to 1, and the solver of gradient estimation
adopts the adam for all types of attacks in all datasets.
Dataset Network Training Configuration Hyperparameters
epochs lr lr decay epochs lr decay rate weight decay layer depth other hyperparameters
CIFAR-10/100
AlexNet 164 0.1 81, 122 0.1 5e-4 9 -
DenseNet-100 300 0.1 150, 225 0.1 1e-4 100 growth rate:12, com-
pression rate:2
DenseNet-190 300 0.1 150, 225 0.1 1e-4 190 growth rate:40, com-
pression rate:2
PreResNet-110 164 0.1 81, 122 0.1 1e-4 110 block name: BasicBlock
ResNeXt-29
(8× 64d)
300 0.1 150, 225 0.1 5e-4 29 widen factor:4, cardinal-
ity:8
ResNeXt-29
(16× 64d)
300 0.1 150, 225 0.1 5e-4 29 widen factor:4, cardinal-
ity:16
VGG-19 (BN) 164 0.1 81, 122 0.1 5e-4 19 -
ResNet-20 164 0.1 81, 122 0.1 1e-4 20 block name: BasicBlock
ResNet-32 164 0.1 81, 122 0.1 1e-4 32 block name: BasicBlock
ResNet-44 164 0.1 81, 122 0.1 1e-4 44 block name: BasicBlock
ResNet-50 164 0.1 81, 122 0.1 1e-4 50 block name: BasicBlock
ResNet-56 164 0.1 81, 122 0.1 1e-4 56 block name: BasicBlock
ResNet-110 164 0.1 81, 122 0.1 1e-4 110 block name: BasicBlock
ResNet-1202 164 0.1 81, 122 0.1 1e-4 1202 block name: BasicBlock
TinyImageNet
VGG-11 300 1e-3 100, 200 0.1 1e-4 11 -
VGG-11 (BN) 300 1e-3 100, 200 0.1 1e-4 11 -
VGG-13 300 1e-3 100, 200 0.1 1e-4 13 -
VGG-13 (BN) 300 1e-3 100, 200 0.1 1e-4 13 -
VGG-16 300 1e-3 100, 200 0.1 1e-4 16 -
VGG-16 (BN) 300 1e-3 100, 200 0.1 1e-4 16 -
VGG-19 300 1e-3 100, 200 0.1 1e-4 19 -
VGG-19 (BN) 300 1e-3 100, 200 0.1 1e-4 19 -
ResNet-18 300 1e-3 100, 200 0.1 1e-4 18 -
ResNet-34 300 1e-3 100, 200 0.1 1e-4 34 -
ResNet-50 300 1e-3 100, 200 0.1 1e-4 50 -
ResNet-101 300 1e-3 100, 200 0.1 1e-4 101 -
DenseNet-161 300 1e-3 100, 200 0.1 1e-4 161 growth rate: 32
DenseNet-169 300 1e-3 100, 200 0.1 1e-4 169 growth rate: 32
DenseNet-201 300 1e-3 100, 200 0.1 1e-4 201 growth rate: 32
Table 19: The details of surrogate model set M, which are used for the random selection of models in SWITCHrnd and the
generation of training data in Meta Attack. All ResNet networks are excluded in the experiments of attacking defensive models.
Defensive Model Dataset Attack ASR Avg. Query Med. Query Dataset ASR Avg. Query Med. Query Dataset ASR Avg. Query Med. Query
ComDefend CIFAR-10
NES 60.8% 1245 550
CIFAR-100
78% 727 300
TinyImageNet
74.8% 1326 500
RGF 41.9% 2061 1173 66.7% 1723 816 43.7% 1855 765
P-RGF 52.1% 2087 1115 78.4% 1523 630 48.8% 1986 866
Meta Attack 19.6% 2363 1562 41.2% 2341 1173 9.2% 2173 1431
Bandits 44.7% 1132 140 56.2% 297 22 52.4% 785 68
PPBA 72.2% 720 103 95.3% 392 35 32.6% 569 73
Parsimonious 99.1% 460 182 98.6% 218 86 91.6% 800 203
SimBA 74.4% 783 218 84% 463 62 72.4% 1525 373
SWITCHrnd 74% 413 6 77.2% 268 8 90.4% 238 8
Feature Distillation CIFAR-10
NES 54.5% 1474 450
CIFAR-100
77.6% 1071 250
TinyImageNet
33.7% 3325 2250
RGF 44.4% 1717 768 62% 1208 408 9% 1619 765
P-RGF 65.8% 1979 703 73.4% 1169 262 25.7% 2231 985
Meta Attack 37.8% 2463 1560 54.4% 1813 912 3.7% 4187 2602
Bandits 59.6% 736 96 80.9% 523 42 12.5% 1272 182
PPBA 93.4% 702 90 97.5% 375 34 72.9% 1942 895
Parsimonious 100% 193 107 100% 101 75 99.5% 359 193
SimBA 86.4% 913 505 95.5% 482 89 47.1% 1509 647
SWITCHrnd 93.4% 199 4 93.8% 162 3 81.3% 356 14
Table 20: Experimental results of untargeted attack under `∞ norm on defensive models with the backbone of ResNet-50.
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(c) untargeted `2 attack WRN-28
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(g) untargeted `∞ attack WRN-28
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Figure 5: Comparison of attack success rate at different limited maximum queries using untargeted attack on CIFAR-10 dataset,
where PyramidNet indicates PyramidNet-272.
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(a) untargeted `2 attack PyramidNet
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(b) untargeted `2 attack GDAS
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(c) untargeted `2 attack WRN-28
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(d) untargeted `2 attack WRN-40
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(e) untargeted `∞ attack PyramidNet
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(g) untargeted `∞ attack WRN-28
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Figure 6: Comparison of attack success rate at different limited maximum queries using untargeted attack in CIFAR-100 dataset,
where PyramidNet indicates PyramidNet-272
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(a) targeted `2 attack PyramidNet-272
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(b) targeted `2 attack GDAS
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(c) targeted `2 attack WRN-28
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Figure 7: Comparison of attack success rate at different limited maximum queries using targeted attack in CIFAR-10.
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(a) targeted `2 attack PyramidNet-272
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(b) targeted `2 attack GDAS
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(c) targeted `2 attack WRN-28
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Figure 8: Comparison of attack success rate at different limited maximum queries using targeted attack in CIFAR-100.
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(a) untargeted `∞ attack DenseNet-121
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(b) untargeted `∞ attack ResNext-101 (32×4d)
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(c) untargeted `∞ attack ResNext-101 (64×4d)
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(d) untargeted `2 attack DenseNet-121
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(e) untargeted `2 attack ResNext-101 (32×4d)
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(f) untargeted `2 attack ResNext-101 (64×4d)
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(g) targeted `2 attack DenseNet-121
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(h) targeted `2 attack ResNext-101 (32×4d)
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(i) targeted `2 attack ResNext-101 (64×4d)
Figure 9: Comparison of the attack success rate at different limited maximum queries in TinyImageNet dataset.
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Figure 10: Comparison of the average query per successful image at different desired success rates in CIFAR-10 dataset, where
PyramidNet indicates PyramidNet-272.
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(a) untargeted `2 attack PyramidNet
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Figure 11: Comparison of the average query per successful image at different desired success rates in CIFAR-100 dataset, where
PyramidNet indicates PyramidNet-272.
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(a) untargeted `∞ attack DenseNet-121
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(b) untargeted `∞ attack ResNext-101 (32×4d)
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(f) untargeted `2 attack ResNext-101 (64×4d)
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 100
Attack Success Rate (%)
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
1600
1800
2000
2200
2400
2600
2800
3000
3200
3400
3600
3800
4000
4200
4400
4600
4800
5000
5200
5400
5600
5800
6000
Av
g.
 Q
ue
ry
Bandits
NES
Meta Attack
SWITCHrnd
SWITCHneg
PPBA
SignHunter
Square Attack
SimBA
(g) targeted `2 attack DenseNet-121
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 100
Attack Success Rate (%)
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
1600
1800
2000
2200
2400
2600
2800
3000
3200
3400
3600
3800
4000
4200
4400
4600
4800
5000
5200
5400
5600
5800
6000
Av
g.
 Q
ue
ry
Bandits
NES
Meta Attack
SWITCHrnd
SWITCHneg
PPBA
SignHunter
Square Attack
SimBA
(h) targeted `2 attack ResNext-101 (32×4d)
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Figure 12: Comparison of the average query per successful image at different desired success rates in TinyImageNet dataset.
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0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000
Query
0
200
400
600
800
1000
Nu
m
be
r o
f S
uc
ce
ss
fu
lly
 A
tta
ck
ed
 Im
ag
es
Bandits
NES
P-RGF
RGF
Meta Attack
SWITCHrnd
SWITCHneg
PPBA
SignHunter
Square Attack
SimBA
(b) untargeted `2 attack GDAS
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000
Query
0
200
400
600
800
1000
Nu
m
be
r o
f S
uc
ce
ss
fu
lly
 A
tta
ck
ed
 Im
ag
es
Bandits
NES
P-RGF
RGF
Meta Attack
SWITCHrnd
SWITCHneg
PPBA
SignHunter
Square Attack
SimBA
(c) untargeted `2 attack WRN-28
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000
Query
0
200
400
600
800
1000
Nu
m
be
r o
f S
uc
ce
ss
fu
lly
 A
tta
ck
ed
 Im
ag
es
Bandits
NES
P-RGF
RGF
Meta Attack
SWITCHrnd
SWITCHneg
PPBA
SignHunter
Square Attack
SimBA
(d) untargeted `2 attack WRN-40
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000
Query
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
Nu
m
be
r o
f S
uc
ce
ss
fu
lly
 A
tta
ck
ed
 Im
ag
es
Bandits
NES
P-RGF
RGF
Meta Attack
SWITCHrnd
SWITCHneg
Parsimonious
SignHunter
Square Attack
SimBA
(e) untargeted `∞ attack PyramidNet
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000
Query
0
200
400
600
800
1000
Nu
m
be
r o
f S
uc
ce
ss
fu
lly
 A
tta
ck
ed
 Im
ag
es
Bandits
NES
P-RGF
RGF
Meta Attack
SWITCHrnd
SWITCHneg
Parsimonious
SignHunter
Square Attack
SimBA
(f) untargeted `∞ attack GDAS
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000
Query
0
200
400
600
800
1000
Nu
m
be
r o
f S
uc
ce
ss
fu
lly
 A
tta
ck
ed
 Im
ag
es
Bandits
NES
P-RGF
RGF
Meta Attack
SWITCHrnd
SWITCHneg
Parsimonious
SignHunter
Square Attack
SimBA
(g) untargeted `∞ attack WRN-28
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000
Query
0
200
400
600
800
1000
Nu
m
be
r o
f S
uc
ce
ss
fu
lly
 A
tta
ck
ed
 Im
ag
es
Bandits
NES
P-RGF
RGF
Meta Attack
SWITCHrnd
SWITCHneg
Parsimonious
SignHunter
Square Attack
SimBA
(h) untargeted `∞ attack WRN-40
0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000 3500 4000 4500 5000
Query
0
200
400
600
800
1000
Nu
m
be
r o
f S
uc
ce
ss
fu
lly
 A
tta
ck
ed
 Im
ag
es
Bandits
NES
Meta Attack
SWITCHrnd
SWITCHneg
PPBA
SignHunter
Square Attack
SimBA
(i) targeted `2 attack PyramidNet
0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000 3500 4000 4500 5000
Query
0
200
400
600
800
1000
Nu
m
be
r o
f S
uc
ce
ss
fu
lly
 A
tta
ck
ed
 Im
ag
es
Bandits
NES
Meta Attack
SWITCHrnd
SWITCHneg
PPBA
SignHunter
Square Attack
SimBA
(j) targeted `2 attack GDAS
0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000 3500 4000 4500 5000
Query
0
200
400
600
800
1000
Nu
m
be
r o
f S
uc
ce
ss
fu
lly
 A
tta
ck
ed
 Im
ag
es
Bandits
NES
Meta Attack
SWITCHrnd
SWITCHneg
PPBA
SignHunter
Square Attack
SimBA
(k) targeted `2 attack WRN-28
0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000 3500 4000 4500 5000
Query
0
200
400
600
800
1000
Nu
m
be
r o
f S
uc
ce
ss
fu
lly
 A
tta
ck
ed
 Im
ag
es
Bandits
NES
Meta Attack
SWITCHrnd
SWITCHneg
PPBA
SignHunter
Square Attack
SimBA
(l) targeted `2 attack WRN-40
Figure 13: The histogram of query number in the CIFAR-10 dataset, where PyramidNet indicates PyramidNet-272.
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000
Query
0
200
400
600
800
1000
Nu
m
be
r o
f S
uc
ce
ss
fu
lly
 A
tta
ck
ed
 Im
ag
es
Bandits
NES
P-RGF
RGF
Meta Attack
SWITCHrnd
SWITCHneg
PPBA
SignHunter
Square Attack
SimBA
(a) untargeted `2 attack PyramidNet
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(c) untargeted `2 attack WRN-28
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Figure 14: The histogram of query number in the CIFAR-100 dataset, where PyramidNet indicates PyramidNet-272.
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(a) untargeted `∞ attack DenseNet-121
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(b) untargeted `∞ attack ResNext-101 (32×4d)
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(c) untargeted `∞ attack ResNext-101 (64×4d)
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(e) untargeted `2 attack ResNext-101 (32×4d)
0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400 1600 1800 2000
Query
0
200
400
600
800
1000
Nu
m
be
r o
f S
uc
ce
ss
fu
lly
 A
tta
ck
ed
 Im
ag
es
Bandits
NES
P-RGF
RGF
Meta Attack
SWITCHrnd
SWITCHneg
PPBA
SignHunter
Square Attack
SimBA
(f) untargeted `2 attack ResNext-101 (64×4d)
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(g) targeted `2 attack DenseNet-121
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(h) targeted `2 attack ResNext-101 (32×4d)
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(i) targeted `2 attack ResNext-101 (64×4d)
Figure 15: The histogram of query number in the TinyImageNet dataset.
